What exactly is ‘N’ in cell culture and animal experiments?, bioRxiv, 2017-09-03

AbstractBiologists establish the existence of experimental effects by applying treatments or interventions to biological entities or units, such as people, animals, slice preparations, or cells. When done appropriately, independent replication of the entity-intervention pair contributes to the sample size (N) and forms the basis of statistical inference. However, sometimes the appropriate entity-intervention pair may not be obvious, and the wrong choice can make an experiment worthless. We surveyed a random sample of published animal experiments from 2011 to 2016 where interventions were applied to parents but effects examined in the offspring, as regulatory authorities have provided clear guidelines on replication with such designs. We found that only 22% of studies (95% CI = 17% to 29%) replicated the correct entity-intervention pair and thus made valid statistical inferences. Approximately half of the studies (46%, 95% CI = 38% to 53%) had pseudoreplication while 32% (95% CI = 26% to 39%) provided insufficient information to make a judgement. Pseudoreplication artificially inflates the sample size, leading to more false positive results and inflating the apparent evidence supporting a scientific claim. It is hard for science to advance when so many experiments are poorly designed and analysed. We argue that distinguishing between biological units, experimental units, and observational units clarifies where replication should occur, describe the criteria for genuine replication, and provide guidelines for designing and analysing in vitro, ex vivo, and in vivo experiments.

biorxiv neuroscience 100-200-users 2017

Is coding a relevant metaphor for the brain?, bioRxiv, 2017-07-28

Short abstractI argue that the popular neural coding metaphor is often misleading. First, the “neural code” often spans both the experimental apparatus and the brain. Second, a neural code is information only by reference to something with a known meaning, which is not the kind of information relevant for a perceptual system. Third, the causal structure of neural codes (linear, atemporal) is incongruent with the causal structure of the brain (circular, dynamic). I conclude that a causal description of the brain cannot be based on neural codes, because spikes are more like actions than hieroglyphs.Long abstract“Neural coding” is a popular metaphor in neuroscience, where objective properties of the world are communicated to the brain in the form of spikes. Here I argue that this metaphor is often inappropriate and misleading. First, when neurons are said to encode experimental parameters, the neural code depends on experimental details that are not carried by the coding variable. Thus, the representational power of neural codes is much more limited than generally implied. Second, neural codes carry information only by reference to things with known meaning. In contrast, perceptual systems must build information from relations between sensory signals and actions, forming a structured internal model. Neural codes are inadequate for this purpose because they are unstructured. Third, coding variables are observables tied to the temporality of experiments, while spikes are timed actions that mediate coupling in a distributed dynamical system. The coding metaphor tries to fit the dynamic, circular and distributed causal structure of the brain into a linear chain of transformations between observables, but the two causal structures are incongruent. I conclude that the neural coding metaphor cannot provide a basis for theories of brain function, because it is incompatible with both the causal structure of the brain and the informational requirements of cognition.

biorxiv neuroscience 100-200-users 2017

Why Does the Neocortex Have Columns, A Theory of Learning the Structure of the World, bioRxiv, 2017-07-13

ABSTRACTNeocortical regions are organized into columns and layers. Connections between layers run mostly perpendicular to the surface suggesting a columnar functional organization. Some layers have long-range excitatory lateral connections suggesting interactions between columns. Similar patterns of connectivity exist in all regions but their exact role remain a mystery. In this paper, we propose a network model composed of columns and layers that performs robust object learning and recognition. Each column integrates its changing input over time to learn complete predictive models of observed objects. Excitatory lateral connections across columns allow the network to more rapidly infer objects based on the partial knowledge of adjacent columns. Because columns integrate input over time and space, the network learns models of complex objects that extend well beyond the receptive field of individual cells. Our network model introduces a new feature to cortical columns. We propose that a representation of location relative to the object being sensed is calculated within the sub-granular layers of each column. The location signal is provided as an input to the network, where it is combined with sensory data. Our model contains two layers and one or more columns. Simulations show that using Hebbian-like learning rules small single-column networks can learn to recognize hundreds of objects, with each object containing tens of features. Multi-column networks recognize objects with significantly fewer movements of the sensory receptors. Given the ubiquity of columnar and laminar connectivity patterns throughout the neocortex, we propose that columns and regions have more powerful recognition and modeling capabilities than previously assumed.

biorxiv neuroscience 100-200-users 2017

 

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